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been intended that a person unable to manage his estate because
of some mental deficiency short of insanity but able to care
for his person should not be interdicted when he was wasting
his property to his detriment?
The courts are moving in this direction of allowing interdiction when a person is unable to care for his property though
he may be able to care for his person. This has been done by
interpreting the caring-for-person requirement to mean more
than performing menial tasks such as dressing, washing, and
doing household chores. In the language of the decisions, insane
persons are often able to do these things, and more capabilities
than these must be present to thwart a judgment of interdiction.41
PROPERTY
Frederick W. Ellis*
Predial servitudes are immovable' real rights. 2 The term
" 'real right' under the civil law is anonymous with proprietary
interest, both of which refer to a species of ownership.' 3 This
definition, although questionable as to some types of real rights,
is certainly correct as to predial servitudes, since they result
4
from a partial dismemberment of the elements of ownership.
It must follow that rules on the acquisition of ownership of
immovables are generally applicable to the acquisition of predial
servitudes., But an opposite conclusion was indicated6 in Blanda
v. Rivers. 7 The case posed a question of whether possession of
49. In re Corbin, 187 La. 968, 175 So. 636 (1937) ; Landry v. Landry, 171
La. 280, 130 So. 866 (1930).
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CIV. CODE art. 471.

2. Id. art. 490.
3. 2 A. YIANNOPOULOs, LOUISIANA CiviL LAW TREATISE 265 (1967), quoting from Hardwood Oil & Mining Co. v. Black, 240 La. 641, 651, 124 So.2d 764,
767 (1960) and Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 541, 105 So.2d 210, 214 (1958).
4. See 2 A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW TREATISE 265 (1967).
5. Of course, it would seem inappropriate to mechanically apply such general
rules where there are contrary special rules on servitudes, or where special interpretation is appropriate to accommodate peculiarities of servitude problems.
6. The word "indicated" is advisedly used. It is questionable whether the
court really "held" that the rules of the rejected articles were inapplicable, in spite
of language to that effect. After rejecting the articles on precarious possession, the
court stated that adverse possession "is essential in the acquisition of ownership
by prescription . . . and must also be an element in the acquisition of a predial
servitude." 210 So.2d 161, 166 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968). It is impossible to hold at
the same time that possession may be precarious but must be adverse.
7. 210 So.2d 161 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968). The case is also interesting for
its holding that visible gas, sewer, heating flue, and water pipes were the subject
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pipes protruding over a neighbor's land was precarious under
possessory rules relating to acquisition of ownership of immovables. The pipes had been installed more than ten years prior
to suit in connection with a permanent and major remodeling
of the defendant's building, for plumbing and heating service
to numerous apartments made in remodeling, all pursuant to
prior verbal permission of plaintiff's ancestor in title. Defendant
used the permission successfully to show good faith. Plaintiff
failed in contending the permission made acquisitive prescription impossible, under the articles on precarious possession.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal refused to apply Civil
Code Articles 3490 and 3556(25) on precarious possession to
acquisitive prescription of a servitude under Article 765 because
Article 3490 is in a section of the Code which relates to acquisition of ownership of property. Curiously enough, a rule on good
faith, being required for ten-year prescription of servitudes,
applied in the opinion, was sired by the relationship between that
very section of the Code and Article 765.9
The court may have been hard pressed to meet the surface
logic of plaintiff's argument, based on Articles 3490 and
3556 (25).10 The argument called for a result that seemed clearly
of a continuous, apparent servitude, where their usage entailed the act of man on
the dominant estate, in turning on taps or flushing commodes. This holding is consistent with other Louisiana jurisprudence. See Note, 28 LA. L. REV. 134
(1967), for a treatment of jurisprudence on whether the act of man must be on
the servient estate to render a servitude discontinuous.
8. 210 So.2d 161, 166. The court had reference to "Section 2 Of the Prescription By Which The Ownership of Property Is Acquired," which appears under LA. CiV. CODE bk. Ili, tit. XXIII, ch. III.
9. The court applied the rule that ten-year prescription of a continuous, apparent servitude under Article 765 requires good faith possession, hut does not require the "just title" called for by the general articles on ten-year good faith prescription, citing Kennedy v. Succession of MeCollam, 34 La. Ann. 568 (1882), and
a discussion of that case in Comment, 15 LA. L. REv. 777, 790 (1955). 210 So.2d
at 164, 165. It was the relationship between Article 3504 in Section 2, note 8
supra, and Article 765, which resulted in the interpretation that good faith is required for Article 765 prescription.
Further proof of the fallacy of the notion that Article 3490 has no application to servitude prescription can be found in Article 3505, under Paragraph 2 of
Section 2, which states: "All of the rules established in the preceding paragraph
[including Article 3490] ... are applicable to the prescription of thirty years ......
The prescription of thirty years unquestionally relates to the acquisition of servitudes under Article 3504. It would seem strange, and without reason, to have
3490 apply to thirty-year servitude prescription and not to ten-year servitude
prescription.
10. The plaintiff contended that the defendant's possession was precarious because commenced by the consent of the owner of the alleged servient estate. The
previously obtained consent of the owner of the neighboring estate formed the
principal basis for the defendant's successful contention that the pipes had been
possessed in good faith. Without considering other articles, the special facts of
the case or the nature of the servitudes, the rule of Article 3490 would have seemingly defeated the defendant's plea of prescription.
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wrong in the light of other recognized principles," since defendant's possession seemed to be so clearly for the benefit of
his own estate and in the good faith belief that he had a right
to have the pipes so located. The abstract question of whether
the Code section in question governed servitude problems may
have been influenced accordingly.
This writer agrees with the result but by use of the rejected
articles, interpreted in light of their purpose and the peculiar
facts of the case.2 Those facts, and especially the implied permanency of the permission, furnish a basis for distinguishing the
case and avoiding its future misuse as precedent for an erroneous
view.3
Whether an object may be acquired by prescription depends
upon its susceptibility to private ownership; that is, whether
it is a public or a private thing.1 4 Civil Code Article 482 provides
that there are things which "though naturally susceptible of
ownership, may lose this quality in consequence of their being
applied to some public purpose, incompatible with private ownership; but which resume this quality as soon as they cease to be
11. It was clear to the court that under the facts of the case: "At no time
did Rivers [the defendant, possess or enjoy the right of servitude for or in the
name of Landry, but always for the exclusive benefit of his estate." 210 So.2d
at 166.
12. Defendant had a building with a party wall on the property line. There
was never any building in the area near the wall on plaintiff's side. In 1951, defendant obtained the permission of Landry, plaintiff's ancestor in title, to install
pipes through holes in the wall, to project over Landry's property, as a part of
major alterations to create rental apartments in defendant's building. No complaints were made until Landry sold his property to plaintiff in1965. The court
treated the matter purely as a servitude prescription problem, since the pipes projected over Landry's land, but it is interesing to speculate whether it might have
been better approached by use of Article 685, relative to the right of an owner of
a wall held in common to affix works thereto with the consent of the other.
13. The defendant would have reasonably believed the permission was permnanent. It was for a permanent installation that could not be replaced without
serious detriment to defendant's property. Continued possession of the space for
the pipes would have been not by revocable indulgence, but in the good faith belief that it was pursuant to a right, i.e., with "just reason to believe himself master of the thing" under Article 3451. The "thing" possessed was not the soil or
the full ownership rights of the estate, but a right of servitude on the space related thereto. Even though commenced "by the leave of another" in one sense-as
is indeed true of most if not all good faith possession commenced under a presumed real right obtained from another-the possession would not have been understood as lasting only "during his [the other's pleasure." Article 3556(25) defines precarious in terms of both elements joined by the conjunctive "and." Even
if "and" was loosely used in the sense of "or" in the article, the added phrase
"during his pleasure" still shows the type of permission contemplated-revocable
indulgence. The cause of precariousness involves an absence of purpose that the
detainer retain the thing indefinitely and thus examples of precarious possession
involve only those arrangements where a permanent right is not granted by the
permission. See 1 PLANIOL, TREATISE ON TIlE CIVIL LAW nos. 2313, 2316 (La.
St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
14. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3479 and 483.
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applied to that purpose, such as the ... streets." (Emphasis
added.)
This Article received no mention in Village of Folsom v.
Alford. ", The opinion relied upon the insusceptibility of streets
to private ownership in making the overly broad statement that
"if there is, at any time, a dedication, no one thereafter is able,
'' 16
by prescription, to acquire title to the dedicated property.
The statement was in response to the contention that the street
had become susceptible of private ownership because of nonuse
and could be the object of acquisitive prescription.
Unless Article 482 and City of New Orleans v. Salmen Brick
& Lumber Co.17 are inapplicable, or unless formal revocation of
a statutory dedication is equated with the question of whether
a street is any longer "applied" to a public purpose, the court's
broad statement is questionable, although perhaps supported by
other broad language in the jurisprudence.""
There is no valid pragmatic reason to exclude property from
commerce and private use or acquisition which has for many
score years never been even partially used for a public purpose.
There are numerous old stillborn subdivisions where streets are
dedicated but never used, and the public authority never gets
around to a formal revocation of the dedication, perhaps in the
hope of ultimately picking up a little oil money from "cow
pasture streets." Although the instant case and other jurisprudence dictates the use of caution by a title examiner in dealing
with private claims of ownership to privately possessed statutorily dedicated"' street areas, in this writer's view the legislation does not call for treating such areas as "public things"
when they have ceased to be or never were applied to public
use. Article 482 plainly supports this view. Revocation of dedications is a method of abandoning public title and vesting it in ad15. 204 So.2d 100 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
16. Id. at 105.
17. 135 La. 826, 66 So. 237 (1914). On rehearing in this case, prior jurisprudence was construed as meaning that a thing ceases to be applied to a public
purpose when it is no longer used for the public purpose. The facts did not seem
to actually make such a situation, but it was rather a case where the property
never was used for public purposes.

1 18. See, e.g., Kemp v. Town of Independence, 156 So. 56 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1934). The case did not actually involve a claim that the property had been acquired by acquisitive prescription because of alleged susceptibility to private ownership due to cessation of public use.
19. Streets which are impliedly dedicated, or which, for other reasons, are
only the subject of a servitude of passage, pose a different question, since the
servitude is subject to ten-year liberative prescription. See Paret v. Louisiana
Highway Comm'n, 178 La. 454, 151 So. 768 (1933).
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joining landowners. It may incidentally cause a street to become
susceptible of private ownership, but it is not the only means of
causing a street area to resume its susceptibility to private
ownership. The statutes which authorize revocation ought not
to be construed as repealing Article 482 and reversing the City
of New Orleans case. 20 Even though a street is dedicated to
public use, this should not prove that it is applied to a public
purpose. Actual public use should be necessary for this purpose
even though unnecessary for vesting title in the public, a completely different matter. The public interest in possible future
use of the streets can be guarded by other means. If municipalities are not presently applying dedicated lands to public use
and if they have long range legitimate intentions to use such
land, a special statute permits them to file a notice to protect
against acquisitive prescription. 1 By analogy to possession and
servitude rules, municipalities which actually apply part of
contiguous street areas to public use, the whole of which were
dedicated to public use by a single act, 22 ought to be viewed
as having applied the whole street to public use. Indeed, close
study of the Village of Folsom case shows such facts, which
might serve as a basis for distinguishing or limiting its future
application. This accords with what seems to be the real purpose
behind making public streets insusceptible of private ownership-to prevent real streets from being partially whittled away
by encroaching private claims.
Two other cases illustrate interesting application of wellestablished principles governing the nature of rights created by
or requirements for dedication of roads or streets, but reflect
some questionable analysis.
In Milliet v. Bonnette,2 3 an unrecorded plat showed a road
and adjoining land was sold off by reference to the road and the
plat. An implied or tacit dedication was correctly recognized as
creating a servitude. The court fortified its conclusion that a
public servitude of passage existed by dictum pointing to the
fact that the Louisiana Highway Department had built the road
20. City of New Orleans v. Salmen Brick & Lumber Co., 135 La. 826, 66 So.

237 (1914).
21. LA. R.S. 9:5804 (1950).
22. Cf. Paret v. Louisiana Highway Comm'n, 178 La. 454, 151 So. 768 (1933),
where the road was the subject of two rights-of-way servitude grants, one for its
original width, and another to widen the road. The extra width, being the subject
of a separate grant, prescribed from non-use. A contrary result might have been
reached if the whole width was the subject of one grant and part of it was used,
although even this view is complicated by Article 798.
23. 203 So.2d 809 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
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and maintained it for more than three years, quoting the prescription provisions of R.S. 48:491. Actually, the three-year
maintenance prescription correctly pertains only to maintenance
by parish or municipal authority. Perhaps R.S. 48:491 might
have been correctly employed, if-and this was not discussedthe opening of the road by the State Highway Department was
by virtue of an act of the legislature,24 or by virtue of some
arrangement with the parish.
Banta v. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans2 5 involved facts
which make one wonder if the rule that an intent to dedicate
must be clearly established really means that an intent to dedicate
need not be clearly established, in practical application. A very
large tract of rural property had been surveyed and divided into
numerous "lots," ranging between 40 and 100 acres in size, with
strips shown on the recorded plat of survey. The disputed strip
did not separate the two lots upon which a mineral servitude
had been reserved in 1935, but traversed both lots. The ultimate
issue was whether the north and south portions were contiguous
for mineral prescription purposes, which turned on whether the
strip was owned by the public in full ownership. The plat bore
an inscription that the "public roads laid out... as indicated
and shown on said map ...while reserved for the purchasers,
ourselves and the public, shall at all times be subject to the
right" of the sugar company subdivider or its assigns to use
it for railroads. The court recognized that there is no doubt
that an intent to dedicate "must be clearly established,' '2 but
reversed the trial court's finding that the intent was not sufficiently proved. The trial court's finding was buttressed by
additional facts: the word "road" did not appear on the unsurveyed strip in question while other strips on the plat were
clearly marked "road" and surveyed by compass courses and
distances; the lot numbering system at the strip in question,
24. LA. R.S. 48:491 (1950) also provides that "all roads . . . opened, laid
out or appointed by virture of any act of the legislature" shall be public roads.
This or the appropriation doctrine seems to vest the state with title to a servitude
immediately upon actual opening or construction of a road by the state, except
when a landowner might speedily seek an injunction and thus avoid an estoppel
which would preclude his objection to the unconstitutionality of the appropriation.
As a practical matter, judicial refinement of the appropriation theory may make
the prescription method of acquiring public servitudes largely moot. See Gray v.
State, Through the Department of Highways, 250 La. 1045, 202 So.2d 24 (1967),
noted 28 LA. L. REv. 652 (1968).
25. 200 So.2d 107 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967), writ refused.
26. 200 So.2d 107, 112 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967) (emphasis added), citing
Mecobon, Inc. v. Police Jury of Jefferson, 224 La. 793, 70 So.2d 687 (1954), which
used the rule in holding that certain symbols on a plat and other circumstances
were not enough to evidence an intent to dedicate a park.
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unlike lot numbering at the other strips on the plat, suggested
that the land on either side was all one lot; a road would have
been neither necessary nor desirable along the disputed strip
due to a nearby parallel and pre-existing public road; and the
strip's presence on the plat was explainable as merely reflecting
the physical presence of a tram railroad apparently used in
private sugar operations. The court of appeal based its reversal
of the trial court's finding on the intent question-which to
this writer was at least arguably a finding of fact that ought
to be subject to the manifest error rule-on the grounds that
the language on the plat and the lines marking the strips and
tramroads "clearly" indicated an intention to dedicate the
disputed strip to the same extent as the other strips shown on
the plat.
This writer long ago developed a belief that subjective rules
pertaining to whether facts must be "clearly" established may
prove unreliable when one analyzes details of the actual application. 27 With all due respect to the court which decided Banta,
and while its view that there was an intent to dedicate the strip
is not unreasonable, only a legal mind can understand how such
unclear evidence could clearly establish an intent to dedicate the
disputed strip. Realistic analysis of the Banta case suggests
that if a subdivision plat is recorded and reflects a strip which
might reasonably be interpreted as evidencing an intent to
dedicate the space as a public road, even if that intent is not
clearly established, a dedication sufficient to vest the public
with title to the soil will probably be judicially recognized. It
is not even necessary, if the case is correct as it seems on this
point, to have an intent to dedicate pursuant to any statute.
Such a result fosters greater employment of prescription to extinguish unused portions of mineral servitudes by dividing larger
tracts into non-contiguous parcels, thus encouraging greater efforts at mineral development and simplifying title problems,
i.e., the result serves the more basic public interest in causing
land to be kept in commerce and utilized. It also favors public
claims over private claims to oil revenue attributable to road or
street spaces, title to which has long been of no concern to
anyone until oil is discovered. But as suggested in the discussion
of the Village of Folsom case, for dedicated areas long unused
as streets or roads the basic public interest in having land used
and in commerce is better served by favoring private possessory
27. Cf. Note, 17 LA. L. REv. 833 (1957).
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interests through classification of unused streets and roads as
private things susceptible to acquisitive prescription.
Coastal States Gas Prod. Co. v. State Mineral Boards illustrates the possible continuing importance of the question of
whether waterbodies are and were navigable in 1812 and therefore public things insusceptible of alienation, even in a case
where there is an apparent severance from sovereignty. It may
also create an undesirable addition to our title law. It was
conceded that the disputed portion of the bed of Bayou Lacassine
had been included within a governmental half section described
in a school lands transfer in 1885 and that the bayou was
navigable now and in 1812.29 The plea of six-year prescription
based on Act 62 of 1912 was rejected by two lines of reasoning.
First the school lands grant was said to be a sale by the
state, because the deed, signed by the parish treasurer, recited
it was sold in the name of the state.2 0 Although the form and
procedure of the sale were in accord with school lands statutes,
the 1912 statute's terms made the prescription (as to transfers
by the state) applicable only to patents signed by the Governor
and Register of the State Lands Office, of record in the State
Land Office. Prescription was said to be stricti juris, and therefore the statute could not be extended beyond the strict letter
of the law, nor could the court explore whether the distinctions
created by the letter of the law were arbitrary and not purposeful. 3 1 The court recognized, however, that if the sale had
been by a subdivision of the state, the statute's terms would
apply.
Secondly, Judge Tate reasoned that navigable waterbottoms
were not "school lands" and therefore the 1885 sale did not
affect the disputed bed. 2 This reason was largely based upon
28. 199 So.2d 554 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
29. The contrary presumption that lands conveyed by a patent are of the
character described therein and as shown by the survey, used in State v. Scott,
185 So.2d 877 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), writ refused, was not discussed, probably
because of the factual concessions. One may guess that the school lands grantee
faced losing his case under Article 509 dereliction or erosion principles if he had
relied on the presumption.
30. This ignored that the sale was under laws which referred to the lands as
belonging to "townships," required the approval of voters of these subdivisions,
was for their benefit, and made not by state officers, but by parish officers. See
La. Rev. Stats. §§ 2958, 2960, 2963 (1870). But Cf. State v. Nicholls, 42 La.
Ann. 209, 7 So. 778 (1890).
31. Strict construction theory and supposed inability of courts to reasonably
construe prescription statutes loses some weight when one recalls liberal construction afforded other prescription laws, e.g., Articles 852 and 853 and Justice St.
Paul's "common sense" reasoning in Opdenwyer v. Brown 155 La. 617, 99 So.
482 (1924).
32. Although there are reasons for distinguishing State v. Scott, 185 So.2d
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the insusceptibility of navigable waterbeds to private ownership argument, derived from Article 453 of the Civil Code and
policy against private ownership of navigable
the famous public
3
waterbottoms.1
There are probably 500,000 or more acres of school or in
lieu lands in Louisiana and unknown quantities of other types
of land which may have been severable from state sovereignty
other than by patents under the pot pourri of ancient laws on
sales or grants of state lands. Undoubtedly, this poses much
chance for technical deficiencies in numerous ancient state
transfers, even though a large majority of school lands may have
not been sold. Have our courts, in the course of protecting state
titles to waterbottoms, created unreasonable headaches for dry
land title examiners, and a happy hunting ground for title or
lease busters? This writer trusts that our courts will understand this hazard to the public interest in stability of titles,
and in any case where navigable waters are not involved, refuse
to extend or reverse a regretable decision.
Given the probable paucity or antiquity of jurisprudence,
and resultant uncertainty in interpreting these old laws, the
unfamiliarity of the bar with their requirements for valid sales
by the state, the economic cost of investigating ancient transactions, the complications of gathering and the unreliability of
ancient evidence, the probable constitutional impossibility of
any new prescriptive statute to quiet titles insofar as mineral
rights are affected, the abundance of caution which title examiners must employ, and the simple injustice of divesting or
clouding numerous long-recognized titles, there are ample policy
it to dry
reasons to reverse the decision, or at least not extend
34
land titles. There are equally sound legal reasons.
SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS
Carlos E. Lazarus*
In Succession of Young,' and Succession of Ramp,2 the court
was again called upon to inquire into the nature and concept of
877 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), still it seems ironic that a presumption contrary to
this reasoning was employed to support the state title in the Scott case. Moreover, the basic logic employed by Judge Tate on this point was rejected by the
majority in California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1 (1954).
33. See e.g., Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1937).
34. See notes 29-33 supra.

*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 205 So.2d 791 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
2. 205 So.2d 86 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967), 252 La. 600, 212 So.2d 419 (1968).

